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Abstract: In this paper, we propose and study analytical models of self-repairing peer-
to-peer storage systems subject to failures. The failures correspond to the simultaneous
loss of multiple data blocks due to the definitive loss of a peer (or following a disk crash).
In the system we consider that such failures happen continuously, hence the necessity of a
self-repairing mechanism (data are written once for ever). We show that, whereas stochastic
models of independent failures similar to those found in the literature give a correct ap-
proximation of the average behavior of real systems, they fail to capture their variations
(e.g. in bandwidth needs). We propose to solve this problem using a new stochastic model
based on a fluid approximation and we give a characterization of the behavior of the system
according to this model (expectation and standard deviation). This new model is validated
using comparisons between its theoretical behavior and computer simulations.
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Analyse de la Corrélation des Pannes dans les Systèmes
de Stockage Pair-à-Pair
Résumé : Dans ce papier, nous proposons et étudions des modèles analytiques pour
des systèmes de stockage pair-à-pair sujet à des pannes. Ces pannes correspondent à la
perte simultanée de multiples blocs de données en raison de la perte définitive d’un des
pairs (ou à la suite d’une défaillance de disque dur). Comme de telles pannes ont lieu en
continu dans le système, un mécanisme de reconstruction est nécessaire pour ne pas perdre
de données. Nous montrons que si les modèles stochastiques proposés précédemment dans
la littérature donnent une approximation correcte du comportement moyen des systèmes
réels, ils ne capturent pas leur variations (par exemple en utilisation de bande passante)
parce qu’ils supposent des pannes de bloc indépendantes. Nous proposons un nouveau
modèle stochastique utilisant une approximation fluide pour résoudre ce problème et nous
caractérisons le comportement du système (espérance et déviation) gâce à ce modèle. Ce
dernier est validé par la comparaison des résultats théoriques avec ceux d’un jeu complet de
simulations.
Mots-clés : système de stockage P2P, corrélation des pannes, évaluation de performance,
durabilité des données, modeèles en châınes de Markov, modèles fluides.
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1 Introduction
Traditional means to store data are dedicated servers or magnetic tapes. These solutions are
reliable but expensive. Recently, hard disks and bandwidth have become cheaper and widely
available, allowing new forms of data storage on distributed, peer-to-peer (P2P) architec-
tures. A large number of such systems have been built: Intermemory [7], Ocean Store [8],
Freenet [5], CFS [6], Total Recall [3]. These systems are cheap to operate, but their highly
distributed nature raises questions about reliability, durability, availability, confidentiality,
and routing of the data.
Storage systems are prone to disk failures. Hence, to ensure the reliability and durability
of the storage, some redundancy needs to be added to the system. Two common methods to
add redundancy are replication and Erasure Correcting Codes (ECCs). It has been shown
that ECCs usually are much more efficient than replication [17]. However, both methods
require an additional self-repairing mechanism to maintain the level of redundancy after
multiple failures.
In this paper, we primarily focus on P2P-based storage systems that have high durability
requirements, such as backup systems. We assume that each subscriber of the backup service
hosts a networked hard disk that runs the P2P backup protocol. As long as no failure
occurs, the peers are assumed to be fully cooperative, always running and to be permanently
connected to a common network or the Internet. The data of each customer are replicated
and spread among numerous peers. The questions we address here are the following: given
a certain level of redundancy and system size, under continuous disk failures, what is the
probability that the system looses some data, or equivalently what is the data lifetime in the
system? How much resources (bandwidth and storage space) are needed to ensure a given
level of reliability (i.e. to ensure that the data loss probability is kept under a given value)?
First we study a Markov Chain Model (MCM) to model the system neglecting correla-
tions that may exist between multiple data losses. In other words, we consider that each
failure event applies to one data block and is independent from other failure events. Using
simulations of a realistic system, we show that the average behavior of the system is ac-
curately given by the model. However, we observe that the variations around this average
behavior are much higher in the simulations than in the MCM. This variance is caused
by the strong correlation between block failures, that are implemented in simulations but
neglected in the MCM. As a matter of fact, the main cause of failure in such a system is a
disk crash (or a peer leaving the system) which impacts tens of thousands of blocks at the
same time. In this paper, we point out the strong impact of this correlation on the system
behavior. Even for large systems with tens of thousands of peers these variations cannot be
neglected. We show that a bandwidth provisioning decision not taking into account these
variations, would lead to a significant loss of data. We then propose a new stochastic Fluid
Model that does not model the behavior of a single block anymore but of the whole system,
i.e. with peers containing many blocks. We provide a mathematical analysis of this model
and validate it by simulations.
Along with faults correlation, we also point out the impact of peer age heterogeneity on
the system. When a disk crashes, it gets replaced by a new disk with no data. This disk
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then gets filled up gradually by the self repairing process. Hence, a young disk has less data
and the system is much more affected by the fault of an old disk. We propose a Refined
Fluid Model that takes into account this phenomenon and its corresponding mathematical
analysis.
To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first study to propose a model that takes
into account the correlations between data blocks failures resulting from the fact that many
data blocks are lost at the same time when a peer is definitely lost (or its disk crashes).
We propose a complete analysis of this model and we show that the results of extensive
simulations of a real system are close to what expected from the analysis.
More precisely, our contributions in this paper are the following:
❼ We study a Markov Chain Model explaining the average behavior of the bandwidth
usage and giving the probability to loose data in the case of independent failures
(Section 3).
❼ We underline the impact of fault correlation even on large systems and show that bad
provisioning policy that do not take this phenomena into account could lead to an
increased loss rate (Section 4).
❼ We propose a new Fluid Model to take into account this correlation. We give a full
mathematical analysis of the model (Section 5).
❼ We bring to light the impact of disk age on the variations of the system and pro-
pose a new shuffling policy and a biased reconstruction policy to reduce this impact
(Section 6).
❼ We validate our models using an extensive set of simulations.
Related work
An abundant literature exists on the topic of P2P storage systems. Several efforts to build
large-scale self-managing distributed systems have been done, among others, Intermemory,
Ocean Store, Freenet, PASTRY, CFS, Total Recall [7, 8, 5, 6, 3]. However, few analytical
models have been proposed to estimate the behavior of the system (the data durability,
resource usage, e.g., bandwidth) and understand the trade-offs between the system param-
eters.
In [17], the authors show that erasure code use an order of magnitude less bandwidth
and storage than replication to provide similar system durability. In [16], a stochastic model
is used to prove that, when there is a low peer availability, a replication scheme may be more
efficient than erasure codes. Conditions where replication has to be preferred are provided
in [10] , along with a discussion on the optimal number of fragments to use.
In [4], the authors show that a scalable system with high peer dynamicity and high
availability is non feasible due to bandwidth limitations. Note that in the backup system
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that we study here, we do not consider churn as the disks are almost continuously connected
to the network. The behavior of a storage system using full replication is studied in [14].
A Markov Chain Model is used to derive the lifetime of the system, and other practical
metrics like storage and bandwidth limits on the system. In [1], the authors also use a
Markovian analysis, but for a system using ECCs. They analyze the performance of two
different schemes (a centralized and a distributed) to recover the data and estimate the data
lifetime and availability.
In all these models, the behavior of a single block is modeled and the block failures are
considered independent. In this paper, we show that this assumption can lead to severe
errors of estimation on the behavior of a system subject to peer failures. We propose new
analytical models for the context of correlated block failures.
2 System Description
Assumptions on system dynamics. We consider here a P2P storage system designed
for back-up. The data of a user are saved once for ever in the system. Since we mainly
focus on the durability of the storage in presence of hardware failures (disk crashes), we
choose to neglect the processes of new data insertions and new peer arrivals in the system
and only focus on the process of maintaining the existing data initially saved in the system:
our system has a fixed amount of user data and a constant number of peers. When a disk
fails, the company replaces it after a short period of time. Reintroduced disks are empty.
To keep the amount of saved data at a constant level, each time a saved user data is lost, it
is reintroduced and dispatched randomly among peers. This purely formal assumption does
not affect the system behavior because dead blocks practically do not happen.
Saved data maintenance process. The data are spread and stored among all peers in
the system according to the following process: Each peer of this system has a disk and is
continuously connected to the network. Users data are saved in units called the initial blocks.
Each initial block is divided into s equally sized fragments to which are added r fragments
of redundancy using erasure code encoding (see [11]) and resulting in a unit of storage called
a system block or more simply a block (in the remaining of the paper, the unqualified term
“block” will always refers to a “system block”). Each block has then n = s + r fragments,
verifying the property that any set of s fragments chosen among the s + r initial fragments
are sufficient to recover (reconstruct) the block. Thanks to this redundancy each block
tolerate up to r faults (i.e. fragment loss). However, partial recovery is not possible: at
least s fragments of the same block need to be concentrated at single place to make the
computation and recover the block. The newly computed fragments are then spread at
random in the system in a way that no peer receives more than one fragment of the same
block.
Peer Failures. Peer are subject to failures, mainly disk crashes. Such events result in
the loss of all the data, i.e., all the fragments present on the disk. Peers are assumed to
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be all similar and to be fully cooperative. They get faulty independently according to a
memoryless process. Given a peer fault rate, α, the probability for a peer to be alive after
a time T is given by a(T ) = e−αT . We note f the probability for a disk to experience a
failure over a period T . We have f = 1 − e−αT . It is important to note that if, for a single
disk, this event is rare, a system with thousands of disks continuously experiences failures.
Different estimations of disk mean time to failure can be found in literature [13], roughly
spanning from 2 years to 20 years. Hence, for example, a system with 20, 000 peers will
experience more than one disk crash per hour assuming 2 years as an average lifetime. As a
consequence, it is vital for the system to monitor the state of all the blocks and to be able
to reconstruct the lost fragments.
Reconstruction. The system implements a threshold-based policy. When a block has less
than r0 fragments of redundancy left in the system, the recovery begins. r0 is called the
reconstruction threshold value. Note that the higher the threshold value, the lower the
probability to loose data, but the higher the bandwidth usage of the system. The case
r0 = r − 1 is a special case called the eager policy where a block is reconstructed as soon
as it lost a fragment. Note that studying different reconstruction policies (like, for example,
rebuilding the most damaged blocks first) would be interesting.
When a block b has to be rebuilt, a peer is chosen uniformly at random to carry out the
reconstruction. First, it has to download s of the remaining fragments. Then it rebuilds the
block. Lastly, it sends the r − r(b) (corresponding to the number of redundancy fragments
missing in the system) to r − r(b) in the system.
A reconstruction uses system resources. The fragments have first to be gathered and
then spread again. The bandwidth usage is then sSf (with Sf the size of a fragment) before
reconstruction and (r−r(b))Sf after, hence (s+r−r(b))Sf in total. CPU time is consumed
as well (the amount depends on the used ECCs). Our study allows to evaluate it, but it
is not a critical resource with the current computers. So we only present results for the
bandwidth. The reconstruction time needed by the system to rebuild a block is the sum of
the time to detection, the time for a peer to download the remaining fragments, to rebuild
the blocks, to cut it into fragments and to send them to random peers.
System state monitoring and resultant control traffic. Monitoring the state of the
system is needed to decide which blocks have lost a critical number of their fragments. A
method to do so is to record on which peers the fragments of each block are located and to
detect peer failures. Different architectures are possible to monitor the state of the system.
A centralized architecture with dedicated servers to store the fragment location information
or a P2P architecture using a Distributed Hash Table (DHT) where peers are responsible
for a subset of the other peers. Then, in an environment with collaborative peers and where
disk crashes are the main cause of failures, knowing which peers are alive is enough. The
control traffic is composed of:
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Table 1: Summary of main notations.
N # of peers
s # of fragments in the initial block
r # of redundancy fragments
n = s + r # of fragments in a system block
p(b) number of remaining fragments of block b
r(b) # of remaining redundancy fragments of block b
r0 reconstruction threshold value
Sf size of a fragment in bytes
B total number of blocks in the system
α peer fault rate
τ time step of the model
f probability for a disk to experience a fault during a time step
δ(i) probability for a block at level i to loose one fragment
❼ Periodic pings to test if the machines are up and running. The time scale (periodicity)
here is in the order of few hours. Indeed, we want to detect real failures and not
temporary events, like a temporary electricity cut. The generated traffic is in the
order of N bytes per hour;
❼ Assignments sent to a peer to reconstruct a block. This assignment may contains the
identity of the peers that will receive the rebuild fragments. For each block reconstruc-
tion, this traffic is of the order of (s + r) log(NB) bits (log N being the size of a peer
id and log B the size of a block id. Note that for a network of 1010 peers or blocks,
this value is below 34.).
As we saw that the data traffic generated for the reconstruction roughly equals the size
of a block, the control traffic is very limited compared to this reconstruction traffic (Sf >>
log N + log B is needed, which is true here as Sf = 400kB). Hence, we will not consider it
in this paper. As so, our following analysis apply to any kind of control infrastructure.
3 Markov Chain Models
We propose here a Markov Chain Model (MCM) for our specific peer-to-peer storage system.
For the sake of clarity of presentation, we do not present here the most accurate and
complex chains, but rather simplified versions (where unlikely transitions are ignored). Ex-
plicit expressions can be derived for these chains. They give very good approximations and
provide the intuition of the system behavior. We actually used more sophisticated chains for
our computations. We also use a poisson reconstruction time for mathematical tractability
and because we think that it takes well into account the random nature of network delays.
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Note that most other types of reconstruction could be captured by MCMs. For example, a
reconstruction lasting a deterministic time can be modeled by labeling the states of a critical
block by the progress of the reconstruction.
The Markov Chain approach allows to model more complex systems or behaviors. For
example several classes of peers, with different disk sizes, fault rates, availabilities, or band-
widths, can easily be introduced. For k families of peers, the state of a block would be a
k-uple {ni}, i ∈ {0, k} where ni is the number of fragments on peers of family i. This would
leads to Markov chains with nk states that could be solved as long as k remains small.
These various chains all have a polynomial (in n) number of states. Hence stationary
distributions and speed of convergence can be computed in less than a second on a computer.
3.1 Description
The behavior of a single block is modeled by a finite Markov Chain with discrete time of
time step τ .
Markov Chain States. The chain has r + 1 states that each represent one of the possible
levels of redundancy of the block and a Dead state. Three different kinds of states can be
distinguished:
❼ Non critical: when the block, b, is such that r0 + 1 ≤ r(b) ≤ r;
❼ Critical: when the block, b, is such that 0 ≤ r(b) ≤ r0;
❼ Dead: when the block has less than s fragments left and cannot be reconstructed. Its
data are lost.
Markov Chain Transitions. A block can be affected by two different kinds of events:
peer failures and reconstructions.
During the evolution of the system, some peers are failing. All the data on the hard
disk is lost in these cases, leading to losses of fragments. Recall that f is the probability
for a peer to get faulty during the timestep τ , f = 1 − e−ατ . Note that we can choose
the transition time of the system, τ , small enough to ensure that only one disk failure can
happen per time step. Since a block has at most one fragment on a disk, disk failures will
result in the loss of at most one fragment per time step in this case. The average number
of fragments lost by a block is less than (s + r)f . A choice of τ such that (s + r)f << 1 is
sufficient. Note also that the concurrent loss of several fragments will then be emulated by
successive fragment losses.
The probability for a block at level i to loose one fragment during a time step is denoted
by δ(i) and is given by
δ(i) := (s + i)f(1 − f)s+i−1.
A block at level 0 may die with probability δ(0). When a block becomes critical (r(b) ≤
r0), the reconstruction starts. The reconstruction is modeled as follows: the average duration
of a reconstruction being noted θ, at each timestep, a critical block has a probability γ := 1/θ
INRIA
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1
r
δ(r)
r − 1
δ(r0 + 1)
δ(0)
Dead
0
r0
r0 + 1
δ(r − 1)
δ(r0)
γ · (1 − δ(0))
γ · (1 − δ(r0))
Figure 1: Markov chain modeling the behavior of one block. Solid and dashed lines respec-
tively represent fault and reconstruction impacts.
to be rebuilt. Note, that we also assume that the blocks that lose a fragment during a time
step can not be reconstructed during the same time step.
If a block looses all its redundancy fragments before being reconstructed (p(b) < s), the
block gets lost: it goes to the dead state. Otherwise at the end of the reconstruction, the
block switches to the top level of redundancy. In our model, due to the stability assumption
(the number of blocks is constant in the system), each dead block immediatly get reborn
as a full redundancy block. This assumption does not change the behavior of the system
noticeably (dead blocks are very rare).
Hence, the Markov Chain transitions are given hereafter and depicted in Figure 1.
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0 < i ≤ r i → i − 1 δ(i)
0 → Dead δ(0)
0 ≤ i ≤ r0 i → r γ · (1 − δ(i))
Dead → r 1
The transitions that leave the block in the same state should be added. These transitions,
of course, are such that the outgoing transition probabilities sum up to 1. Note that in the
system, we choose to implement the reconstruction after the impact of failures during the
time step. Both choices are possible, it changes only slightly the transitions.
3.2 Analysis
Stationary distribution. The above finite Markov chain is irreducible and aperiodic.
Hence, it admits a unique stationary distribution denoted by P . P (x) is the stationary
probability to be in state x. The stationary distribution of the Markov chain can be com-
puted exactly in time polynomial in n by finding the eigenvector with eigenvalue 1. The
complexity is independent of the number of blocks B, or of the number of peers N . Note
that, because of the simple form of the system, we can compute the stationary distribution,
as seen hereafter.
Remark on the initialization phase. Initially all the blocks have all their fragments
(r(b) = r). As the system evolves and failures happen, some blocks drop to a lower level
of redundancy. Hence, during a long transient phase the distribution tends to be extremely
concentrated toward the maximum levels of redundancy. To avoid this phenomena, it could
be good to introduce in the real system heterogeneous levels of redundancy at the start
according to the stationary distribution. Note also that in a storage system where the peers
appears gradually, the transient phase will be very limited.
Expression of the Stationary Distribution.
Let P denote the stationary distribution. P (x) is the stationary probability to be in state
x. As already claimed, for fixed values of the system parameters (θ, n, r0), the stationary
distribution can be computed in polynomial time by finding the eigenvector with eigenvalue
1 or simply by a Howard Perron Frobenius iteration. Note that, because of the simple form
of the system (the system without the first row is lower triangular), we can compute the
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stationary distribution more efficiently as follows:
P (r − 1) = δ(r)
δ(r−1)P (r)
P (r − 2) = δ(r−1)
δ(r−2)P (r − 1) =
δ(r)
δ(r−2)P (r)
.. = ..
r0 < i < r P (i) =
δ(r)
δ(i) P (r)
0 < i ≤ r0 P (i) =
δ(i+1)
δ(i)+γ(1−δ(i))P (i + 1)
P (Dead) = δ(0)P (0)
All probabilities are expressed in function of P (r) which can computed by the normalization:
r
∑
i=0
P (i) + P (Dead) = 1.
Expression of the Bounds for a Simplified Chain. To get a simpler expression of the
stationary distribution, we present and analyze here a simplified chain. The goal is to give
the intuition of how behaves the system in function of the parameters and to give explicit
closed formulas.
The simplified chain assumes the following simplifying hypothesis: the probability to
loose a fragment is g = e(s + r)f , the same for all levels. Note that the simplified chain is
“pessimistic”. Pessimistic here means that the bandwidth needed by the simpler chain is an
upper bound of the bandwidth needed by the real system. The probability to loose a block
is higher or, equivalently, the average block lifetime is lower. The transitions of the chain
are then given by
0 < i ≤ r i → i − 1 g
0 → Dead g
0 ≤ i ≤ r0 i → r γ(1 − g)
Dead → r 1
Let us note P ∗ = P (r) and express all the stationary probabilities in function of P ∗. For
all states i, such that r0 < i ≤ r, we have P (i) = gP (i + 1) + (1 − g)P (i). It gives
P (i) = P (i + 1) = P ∗.
For all states i such that 0 ≤ i ≤ r0, we have P (i) = gP (i + 1) + (1 − g − γ(1 − g))P (i). It
gives
P (i) =
g
g + γ(1 − g)
P (i + 1).
That is, if we note ρ := g
g+γ(1−g) ,
P (i) = ρr0−i+1P ∗.
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Last, P (dead) = gP (0), giving
P (dead) = gρr0+1P ∗.
P ∗ is then evaluated using
∑r
i=0 P (i) + P (dead) = 1.
P ∗
(
r − r0 + (ρ + . . . + ρ
r0+1 + gρr0+1)
)
= 1.
That is
P ∗
(
r − r0 +
(
ρ − ρr0+2
1 − ρ
+ gρr0+1
))
= 1.
We get the following approximations:
P ∗ ≈
1
r − r0 +
ρ
1−ρ
.
But we have ρ1−ρ =
g
γ(1−g) , simplifying the expression to
P ∗ ≈
1
r − r0 +
g
γ(1−g)
.
It directly gives the average number of blocks lost during a time step:
#deads ≈ ρr0+1
g
r − r0 +
g
γ(1−g)
B,
with B the total number of blocks in the system. Note that the number of deads decreases
exponentially with the threshold value r0. Notice also that the base of the exponential
ρ := 11+ γ
g
(1−g) depends of the proportion γ/g. As expected, the more the reconstruction
ratio is greater than the failure ratio the less deads there are.
Similarly we get the average number of blocks under reconstructions during a time step
(it is the sum of the blocks at level 0 ≤ i ≤ r0):
#reconstructions ≈
γ(1 − g)
g
1
r − r0 +
g
γ(1−g)
B.
We see that the number of reconstruction is almost proportional to the inverse of r− r0. As
a matter of fact, dividing r0 by 2 roughly leads to reconstruct the block after twice as many
fragment losses. Note that it gives an estimation of the bandwidth need of the system.
We get the average number of blocks lost during a time step:
#deads ≈ ρr0+1
g
r − r0 +
g
γ(1−g)
B,
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with B the total number of blocks in the system and ρ := 11+ γ
g
(1−g) . Note that the number
of deads decreases exponentially with the threshold value r0. Notice also that the base of
the exponential ρ depends of the proportion γ/g. As expected, the more the reconstruction
ratio is greater than the failure ratio the less deads there are.
Similarly we get the average number of blocks under reconstructions during a time step
(it is the sum of the blocks at level 0 ≤ i ≤ r0):
#reconstructions ≈
γ(1 − g)
g
1
r − r0 +
g
γ(1−g)
B.
We see that the number of reconstruction is almost proportional to the inverse of r− r0. As
a matter of fact, dividing r0 by 2 roughly leads to reconstruct the block after twice as many
fragment losses. Note that it gives an estimation of the bandwidth need of the system.
4 Study of correlation effects
As always, the MCM for a single entity allows to compute all the expectancies in system of
B correlated entities (from the linearity of the expectation). However, this approach usually
does not tell anything about the deviation from the mean. This is the case here, because
of the very strong correlation that exists between block failures, as, when a disk crashes,
tens of thousands of blocks are affected at the same time. Indeed the deviations are far
bigger than the ones that would appear in an independent system (which are standard to
compute).
We ran extensive experiments: first to check the consistency of the MCM expectation
with the simulation and to validate the model simplifications (in Section 4.2); but mainly
to observe the deviations from the mean. We show in Section 4.4 the significant impact of
correlation on the variations of bandwidth usage, even for a large system. In Section 4.5, we
examine a provisioning scenario based on a model assuming block independence. It shows
that, when not taken into account, this variation could lead to a very high loss rate (or
equivalently a very low data lifetime).
4.1 Simulations
We implemented a custom cycle-based simulator to evaluate the several characteristics of a
real system. The simulator does not aim at capturing the low level details of the network
(such as packet level communication, traffic congestion or latency), but it focus on the
global evolution of the blocks of data in the system in the presence of peer failures and
reconstructions.
The simulator uses a detailed view of the system, as it monitors each fragment individ-
ually. The number of fragments is B(s + r). As an example, for 5000 peers with a disk of
only 5GB, there are already 25 millions of fragments. Hence real life large systems can not
be simulated and we need to rely on formal analysis.
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Simulation Model (SM). The simulator simulates precisely the evolution of the blocks
in the system, that is their state at each time. For each disk, it stores a list of all the blocks
having a fragment on it. When a disk fault occurs, the simulator updates the state of the
blocks having lost a fragment. Precisely, during each cycle the simulator performs three
phases:
1. generate disk failures;
2. handle the reconstruction of critical blocks:
(a) for each block, test if its reconstruction is over;
(b) if so, choose randomly r − r(b) peers and add a fragment to their disk;
3. ensure the stability of the system:
❼ by reintroducing fragments of the dead blocks in the system;
❼ by reintroducing empty disks in replacement of crashed disks.
Initialization Phase. At the beginning each block is at full redundancy and has n = s+ r
fragments. The fragments of the B blocks are uniformly distributed at random among nodes.
Thus, each node starts with an average of B(s+ r)/N fragments. Note that during the first
phase of the simulation, the system is in a transient phase. The cycles corresponding to
this phase are not considered when we give results in the following section. We focus on the
properties of the stationary phase of the system.
Monitored metrics. The simulator monitors different metrics of the system. The main
ones are the number of reconstructions (hence the bandwidth usage), the number of dead
blocks and the redundancy level of blocks (hence the number of available fragments). But
it stores also other metrics like the disk lifetimes and the disk occupancy.
At end of each cycle, a trace is generated containing all this information. The bandwidth
consumption BW is calculated using the number of on-going reconstructions during each
cycle. The reconstruction of a block b uses a bandwidth corresponding to the s fragments
that have to be gathered by the peer in charge of the reconstruction and to the r − r(b)
fragments that have to be redistributed among peers at the end of the reconstruction. In
total, that is (s + r − r(b))Sf . For the total bandwidth consumption, we sum over all
blocks in reconstruction Brec and we divide by the timestep τ and by θ, as the bandwidth
is distributed over the whole time of reconstruction. We get
BW =
Sf ·
∑
b∈Brec
(s + r − r(b))
τ · θ
.
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Average bandwidth usage (in Mbits/s)
r0 1 3 6 9
MCM 0.75 1.23 2.90 14.74
SM 0.75 1.23 2.91 14.80
Proportion of dead blocks
r0 1 3 6 9
MCM 4.98e − 03 1.23e − 06 9.55e − 12 3.0e − 16
SM 5.1e − 03 0 0 0
θ 1 12 24 36
MCM 0.0009 0.071 0.29 0.60
SM 0.0003 0.073 0.26 0.61
Table 2: Average bandwidth usage and proportion of dead blocks of the SM versus the
expectations of the MCM for different values of the parameters.
Simulation suite and default parameters. We did a large number of simulations for
different set of parameters. When not otherwise explicitly indicated, the simulations are
given for a system with the following default parameters.
We chose a medium sized system with N = 5000 peers. However, note that, as stated,
we simulated different scenarios with different values of the parameters: we also simulated
system with N spanning from 25 to several millions of peers. We use an initial block
size of 3.6MB. This initial block is divided into s = 9 fragments of size Sf = 400KB and
r = 6 redundancy fragments are added. This leads to a (system) block size of 6MB. The
reconstruction threshold value is chose to be r0 = 3. The system-wide number of blocks
is B = 5 · 105 (i.e. 2.86TB), which leads to an average of 600MB per disk. This value
was chosen so that the memory of our machines is sufficient to run the simulations in a
reasonable time. However, we show in the following that an increased amount of data per
disk would only intensify the impact of block correlation. The average time to reconstruct a
block is θ = 10 hours. It represents the delay to discover critical blocks (this time is in the
order of few hours as we do not want to consider temporary disappearance of a peer for a
failure), the time to collect the remaining fragments, to recalculate the erasure code and to
redistribute the missing fragments. The average lifetime of a disk or Mean Time Between
Failures (MTBF) is assumed to be 5 years (see e.g. [13, 15] for a discussion). In general, the
simulation time Tsim was chosen to be 50 years, with a time step of one hour, which leads
to 438000 cycles.
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4.2 Average Behavior of the System
We compare here the results for the simulations of SM with what is predicted from the
analysis of the MCM. First, we study the average behavior of the system for different values of
the parameters. We present here a representative subset of all our experiments. Table 2-TOP
compares the average bandwidth usage of the Simulation Model (SM) with the corresponding
expectations derived from the Markov Chain Model (MCM). We varied the threshold value
r0 from 1 to 9 (r = 10 is chosen in this experiment) and θ, the mean time to finish a block
reconstruction between 1 and 36 hours. We observe that the values are extremely close for
both models: the difference only consists in few tens of percents for all the cases. The MCM
gives precisely the average bandwidth usage of the system.
The second fundamental statistics of the system is the amount of data lost by the system.
Table 2-BOTTOM gives the average proportion of dead blocks among all the blocks. Note
that the parameters of the system have to be chosen in such a way that this proportion is
extremely low (e.g. in the order of 10−15). Therefore it is non feasible to study such rare
events using this simulation technique. Accordingly, we see that for r0 ≥ 3 the simulation
does not experience any loss (up to 200 years were simulated in this experiment with disk
lifetime (MTBF) as low as 1 year). The theoretical proportion given by the MCM is 3 ·10−16
in the case r0 = 9. To be able to compare the theory and the simulation, we chose less
realistic parameters, so that the simulated systems experiences losses during our simulation
duration. As an example, we set some long reconstruction time of 36 hours with a very
short disk MTBF of 180 days. We observed that both sets of values are very close.
To summarize, we see that the MCM models very closely the average behavior of the
system. However, we show in the following that the MCM fails to capture the variations
around this average behavior displayed by the simulation results.
4.3 The problem of correlation
One disk failure impacts all the blocks that have fragments stored on the faulty disk. Hence
block trajectories are very dependent since the events of our system are disk crashes which
can be seen as correlated fragment losses.
An example of system. We simulated a system of medium size with 5000 peers for 50
years. Figure 2 gives the experimental distribution of the bandwidth usage in two cases: the
simulation of the real system SM (top plot) and the simulation of a system with independent
block faults, modeled by the MCM (bottom plot) and named Sim. Model Indep. in the
plots. As previously stated the average value of both systems are very close (5.55 versus
5.50 Mbits/s). On the contrary the variations around this average are totally different. The
standard deviation is 2.23 Mbits/s in the first case, to compare with only 0.1 Mbits/s in the
second one. Hence, we see that the impact of fault correlation is very strong on the behavior
of the system.
Note that the standard deviation of the independent model can be deduced directly from
the MCM. Each block has a probability p =
∑r0
i=0 P (i) of being in reconstruction, with P
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Figure 2: Histogram of the bandwidth used by the system. Top: System with disk failures.
Bottom: system with independent block faults.
the stationary distribution of the MCM. Hence, the total number of blocks in reconstruction
is the sum of independent variables and follows a binomial distribution of parameters B and
p. This distribution is very concentrated around its mean Bp and the standard deviation is
given by
√
Bp(1 − p).
4.4 Correlation and the System Size
The impact of fault correlation depends on the system size. A somewhat extreme case is
when the number of peers is equal to the number of fragments of a block at full redundancy,
that is N = n. In such a system all the blocks loose one fragment whenever a disk crashes and
all the blocks follow the same trajectory. Almost at the opposite, when the disk contains
few fragments (the extreme being each disk contains at most one fragment), trajectories
do get independents and the system does not deviate from its mean. These two extreme
examples illustrate the fact, that the impact of correlation depends on the ratio between
the number of fragments per disk and the number of peers (a peer failure simultaneously
impacts about (s + r)B/N fragments). In an extremely large system, the dynamic gets
closer to the independent case. The following simulations confirm this intuition.
To illustrate this and show the dependence of correlation and the number of peers in
the system, we simulated experiments with the fixed amount of data in the system (same
number of blocks), but with varying numbers of peers and disk sizes. The number of blocks
is 2.5 ·105. It corresponds to 3.75 ·106 fragments. We varied the number of peers between 25
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Figure 3: Standard deviation of bandwidth used versus the size of the system.
and 1 million. The standard deviation of the system with dependent and independant block
failures are plotted in Figure 3. As expected, the standard deviation of the independent
system does not change much, as it does not depend on the system size, but on the number
of blocks which is constant here. Two important facts have to be noticed here:
1. The standard deviation of the dependent system is very far from the one of the inde-
pendent system. This is obvious for small systems: 9.6 vs. 0.09 for 100 peers. But
this is true even for large systems: the deviation is still 5 times higher for a system
with 50, 000 peers.
2. The deviation of the dependent system decreases monotonically with the system size
toward the limit obtained for the independent system. In this example, when the
number of peers reaches 3 millions, both standard deviation are the same.
Note that the occupation of the hard disks in this experiment is only 600 MB. For a
larger amount of data, the correlation would be even larger, and still strong for system
with millions of peers.
4.5 Bandwidth Provisioning and Loss of Data
We showed that the fault correlation has a strong impact on the variations of the bandwidth
usage. But will these variations really affect the system? What will happen if the amount of
bandwidth available is limited? When a spike occurs in the number of blocks to be rebuilt,
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Figure 4: Number of block losses for different provisioning scenarios using the SM.
some reconstructions will be delayed. Will it impact the probability to loose data or will
the reconstructions be done when more bandwidth is available without negative effects?
To answer these questions, we simulate different scenarios with bandwidth limitation.
This limit varies from µ to µ + 10σ, with µ and σ respectively the expectation and the
standard deviation given by the MCM. In these experiments, when the bandwidth is not
sufficient to carry out all the needed reconstructions, a queue is used to store the blocks to
be rebuilt. The reconstructions then start in FIFO order when bandwidth is available.
Figure 4 shows the cumulative number of dead blocks (i.e. total number of blocks whose
remaining fragments have fallen below s) for different limits of bandwidth. This system is
similar to the one in Figure 2, but here we simulated 400 years. We see that limiting the
bandwidth has very strong impact. Between µ (5.5Mbits/s) and µ + 5σ (6.04), the number
of dead blocks dropped from 4.3 ·103 in the former to 196 in the later. If we have no limit on
the bandwidth, we also computed that the cumulative number of deads drops to 11, which
is respectively 400 and 18 times less than the former cases.
Note that for all these experiments, the available bandwidth is greater than the average
bandwidth of the MCM. Hence, it only is the fact of delaying some block reconstructions, that
increases the probability to loose fragments. As a consequence, provisioning the system based
on a model assuming block independence, as the MCM, could lead to disastrous effects. As
a matter of fact, in the MCM the bandwidth usage is very concentrated around its mean.
For example, the probability to exceed µ + 5σ is less than 5.810−7. A provisioning of this
amount of bandwidth seems a very safe one. But as we see in Figure 4, such a dimensioning
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of the system would lead to large losses of data. Therefore, it is be very important to have
a model that takes fault correlation into account.
5 A New Stochastic Model
In this section we address the problem of block correlations. We propose a Fluid Model (FM)
that does not represent the behavior of a single block anymore but of the whole system. We
give a theoretical analysis in Section 5.2, giving its average behavior, the variation from
its mean and a way to compute any of its moments. In Section 5.4, we show by mean of
simulations that the FM models very closely the variations of a realistic system.
5.1 The New Model
The key question that araises from the observations made in Section 4 discussion is to provide
a way to analyze such a strongly correlated system. Block states could be fully described by
a vector encoding the location of its fragments. This leads to a gigantic Markov Chain (with
around N (s+R)B states) that indeed represents our simulator SM. However intuition tells
us that what matter for a block is its number of fragments not their location. Indeed, at
each time step, everything seems to happen as if the fragments were distributed uniformly
over the disks at random. So to analyze the system we use this hypothesis (we discuss it in
Section 6). This assumption implies that the blocks at the same level are equivalent. Hence
a Markov Chain that counts how many blocks are at each level can be used. This discrete
chain can be formally described, but it is still too large for practical use (it has (r + 1)B
states). However since many blocks are in the same state, we use a fluid approximation for
that chain (see [9, 2] for references on fluid models).
We present here this stochastic Fluid Model, with discrete time of time step τ . Generally,
the system is completely described by the vector Y (t) of dimension r in which Yi counts the
percentage of blocks that are in state i. Then the evolution of the state vector is modeled
as follows. At each time step, either no disk fault occurs and we only account for the effects
of the reconstructions or a fault occurs and the block losses are added. The model makes
the following assumptions:
❼ At most one disk gets faulty during a cycle. (Note that it is sufficient to choose τ
small enough to ensure that multiple failures almost never happen).
❼ During a time step, a fault happens with probability l = αNτ . Recall that α is the
peer fault rate (see Section 2).
❼ A fault induces the loss of an exact proportion 1/N of the fragments present in the
system. This hypothesis equivalently says that there is a uniform repartition of the
fragments per disk. If we also assume that the repartition of the blocks into different
states is the same for each disk, it gives that, when a fault occurs, (s+i)Ys+i
N
fragments
are lost. Let us note µi =
(s+i)
N
. For the model, it means that µiYs+i blocks go from
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the state s + i to the state s + i − 1. The two hypothesis on the fragment repartition
will be later discussed in Section 6 where we propose a refined model.
Let us summarize the new notations that will be used throughout this section:
l probability to have a disk fault during a time step
µi fraction of blocks in state i affected by a failure
γ fraction of blocks reconstructed after a time step (γ = 1/θ)
The fluid approximation of the system is then:
Yi(t + 1) = Yi(t) for r0 + 1 ≤ i ≤ s − 1,
Yi(t + 1) = (1 − γ)Yi(t) for 1 ≤ i ≤ r0,
Ys(t + 1) = Ys(t)
∑r0
i=1 γYi(t),
when no fault occurs (reconstruction only). The effects of a fault on a state vector X(t) are:
Xi(t + 1) = (1 − µi)Xi(t) + µi+1Xi+1(t) for 1 ≤ i ≤ s − 1,
Xs(t + 1) = (1 − µs)Xs(t) + µ1X1(t).
When a fault occurs, both the effects of the reconstruction and of the fault act on the state
vector. Note that we consider in our model that the fault occurs after the reconstruction.
Hence the fluid approximation of the system is:
Yi(t + 1) = (1 − µi)Yi(t) + µi+1Yi+1(t) for r0 + 1 ≤ i ≤ s − 1,
Yr0(t + 1) = (1 − µr0)(1 − γ)Yr0(t) + µr0+1Yr0+1(t),
Yi(t + 1) = (1 − µi)(1 − γ)Yi(t) + µi+1(1 − γ)Yi+1(t) for 1 ≤ i ≤ r0 − 1,
Ys(t + 1) = (1 − µs)Ys(t)
∑r0
i=1 γYi(t) + µ1(1 − γ)Y1(t).
when a fault occurs.
5.2 Analysis
The analysis of the Fluid Model boils down to the analysis of a random matrix (or matrix
distribution), M(t, ω). Note that it is a difficult problem: there exist no general theory to
get the distribution of a random product of two matrices. It is not surprising since, for
RR n➦ 6771
22 Dalle, Giroire, Monteiro, Pérennes
example, only determining if the infinite product of two matrices is null is an undecidable
problem [12].
A transition of the system transforms the state vector X = (X1, · · · , Xn) according to
X(t + 1, ω) = M(t, ω)X(t, ω).
M(t, ω) depends of two matrices, R and F ′ respectively representing the effects of a recon-
struction and of a disk fault on the state vector. They are defined as:
F ′ =









1 − µ µ
µ
. . .
. . .
. . .
. . .
. . .
µ 1 − µ









R =










1 γ · · · γ
. . .
1
1 − γ
. . .
1 − γ










At the time t, the random matrice is equal to PR if there is a failure and to R otherwise.
We have
M(t, ω) =
{
F ′R with probability l (disk fault);
R with probability 1 − l (reconstruction only).
In the following, we note F = F ′R for simplicity.
Expression of the expectation of the Fluid Model.
E[X(t + 1, ω)] = E[M(t, ω)]E[X(t, ω)].
We clearly have
E[M(t, ω)] = lF + (1 − l)R.
The linear operator E[M(t, ω)] is a probability matrix and one can check with the computer
that it has no eigenvalue with norm one other than 1. Hence we have E[X(t, ω)] converges
to E0, solution of the equation
E0 = (lF + (1 − l)R)E0.
Note, that we get the same expectation than with the Markov Chain model, indeed (lF +
(1 − l)R) is roughly equivalent to the MCM transition matrice.
Expression of the standard deviation of the Fluid Model.
We want to compute the standard deviation of the state vector X, meaning the standard
deviation of each of its coordinates. We recall that each coordinate corresponds to the
number of blocks in a given state.
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Let start by computing E[X2].
X(t + 1, ω)2 = (M(t, ω)X(t, ω))2.
That is
X2i =


n
∑
j1=1
mij1Xj1




∑
j2
mij2Xj2

 .
We get
X2i =
∑
j1,j2
mij1mij2Xj1Xj2 .
Note that, as X2 depends of all the cross-products of Xi and Xj , we have to compute all
their expectations.
Expression of the expectations of the cross-products.
We have
XiXj =
(
n
∑
k1=1
mik1Xk1
)(
n
∑
k2=1
mjk2Xk2
)
.
Hence
XiXj =
∑
k1,k2
mik1mjk2Xk1Xk2 .
It gives for the expectations:
E[XiXj ] = E[
∑
k1,k2
mik1mjk2Xk1Xk2 ].
By linearity and independence (of mij and Xi), we obtain
E[XiXj ] =
∑
k1,k2
E[mik1mjk2 ]E[Xk1Xk2 ].
The method is to write a linear system of equations linking the cross-product expectations
at time t+1 with the expectations at time t. Let ind be the function [1, n]× [1, n] → [1, n2],
ind(i, j) = (i − 1)n + j. Let us define the matrix N by
Ni′j′ = E[mi,k1mj,k2 ],
with i′ = ind(i, j) and j′ = ind(k1, k2). Note that this matrix is of dimensions n
2 × n2. By
definition of the matrice of transition M(t, ω), we have
E[mik1mjk2 ] = l(Fik1Fjk2) + (1 − l)(Rik1Rjk2).
Hence, we get
Ni′j′ = l(Fik1Fjk2) + (1 − l)(Rik1Rjk2).
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Now, if we note Z the vector of the cross-products (Zind(i,j) = XiXj), we have
E[Z(t + 1, ω)] = N(t, ω)E[Z(t, ω)]
Again, as the linear operator E[Z(t, ω)] is a probability matrix and that it can be checked
that it has no eigenvalue with norm one other than 1, we have E[Z(t, ω)] converges to E0,
solution of the equation
E0 = N(t, ω)E0.
When Z is computed (by a resolution of a linear system with n2 variables and equations),
we can extract the coefficients E[X2i ] and compute the standard deviations with
σ(Xi) =
√
E[X2i ] − E[Xi]
2.
Conclusions for the number of reconstructions and the bandwidth. The number
of blocks in reconstruction ξ is equal to the sums of the number of blocks in the states from
0 to r0. So ξ =
∑r0
i=0 Xi. We have
E[ξ] =
r0
∑
i=0
E[Xi] and V[ξ] =
r0
∑
i=0
r0
∑
j=0
cov[XiXj ].
The covariances can be extracted from the previous computations (cov[Xi, Xj ] = E[XiXj ]−
E[Xi]E[Xj ]).
Each reconstruction lasts in average 1/γ, translated in the model by a probability γ to
be reconstructed. Hence the bandwidth, BW , used by the system during on time step is
BW = γξsb/s.
Recall that b is the size of a block and s the number of fragments needed to reconstruct the
block. Hence we get the expectation and the variance of the bandwidth by
E[BW ] = γbE[ξ] and V[BW ] = γ2b2V[ξ].
Remark: Any of the moments can be computed with the same method.
5.3 Explicit expressions for the eager policy
Numerical computations for the expectation and the standard deviation of the number of
reconstructions are given in Section 5.4. But before, explicit expressions can be deduced for
the eager reconstruction policy.
In the eager policy, a block is reconstructed as soon as one of its fragment is lost. Hence
the number of reconstructions just is a fraction γ of the number of blocks which lost at least
one fragment (meaning all blocks in states < s + r). So, if we only want to analyze the
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Figure 5: Timeseries of the bandwidth used by SM and FM for 5 years.
use of bandwidth (there are no dead in the system), the model is equivalent to a two state
model: the states s + r with the blocks with all their fragments and the state < s + r with
the blocks with some fragments missing.
The state vector is X = (Xs+r, X<s+r), with X<s+r the number of blocks in reconstruc-
tion. The intermediate calculuses are omitted here
E[X<s+r] =
B
1 − (1 − 1
lµ
)γ
.
E[X2<s+r] =
c1B
2 + B(c2 − 2c1)E[X<s+r]
1 − c1 + c2 − c3
,
with c1 = lµ
2, c2 = 2lµ(µ − 1)γ + 2lµ and c3 = l(µγ + 1 − γ)
2 + (1 − l)(1 − γ)2.
5.4 Validation of the model
We ran simulations to see how close the Fluid Model (FM) is from the Simulation Model
(SM). The behavior of the FM is given by two ways: the FM is simulated for Figure 5
(meaning that at each cycle we randomly choose the transition matrix of the state vector
between F and R), but numeric computations from the mathematical analysis are given in
Table 5.4.
Figure 5 presents the timeseries of the use of bandwidth. The top plot is for the system
simulation and the bottom one for the Fluid Model. As with the MCM, the expectations are
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N 25 50 100 250 500 1000 5000 5 · 104
SM 15.66 11.93 8.82 5.68 2.88 1.30 0.58 0.41
FM 13.38 9.11 6.39 3.99 2.01 0.88 0.39 0.28
r0 1 3 5 7 9
SM 1.07 1.02 1.00 0.98 0.93
FM 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.67
MTBF 1 2 3 4 5 6 8 10
SM 0.40 0.58 0.69 0.80 0.90 0.97 1.11 1.54
FM 0.28 0.39 0.48 0.55 0.61 0.67 0.77 1.19
Table 3: Standard error (StdDev/Mean) for SM, FM and MCM (MTBF is in years).
pretty close (few tenths of percent). But in addition, the variations have now the same order
of magnitude. However the standard errors (the standard error is defined as the standard
deviation divided by the mean) still differ by around 20 to 40 percents in most cases, as
shown in the summary of simulation with different sets of parameter given in Table 5.4.
It gives the need for a reexamination of the hypothesis of the model. Hence, we propose
a Refined Fluid Model in the next section.
6 Impact of disk age: a refined model
6.1 Problem
When a disk fails, it is replaced by a new empty disk. This disk fills up with reconstructions,
like the other disks in the system. Recall that when a block is reconstructed, each of
the fragment rebuilt is sent on a random peer (in a way no two fragments are sent to
the same peer). Hence, at each timestep, the partition of the rebuilt fragments between
the peers follows a multinomial distribution of parameters N and 1/N . As the multinomial
distribution is very concentrated around its mean, the filling up process can be approximated
by a affine process of its age, where, at each timestop, each disk gets in average the number
of reconstructed fragments divided by the number of peers.
It is now important to point out that at each moment disks with very heterogeneous
number of fragments are present in the system. As the process to fill up a disk is close to an
affine function of its age, it is equivalent up to a constant to look at disk age or disk filling
up. The age of death follows a geometric law of parameter f , as at each timestep a disk has
a probability f to experience a fault. That is,
Pr[death age = k] = (1 − f)k−1f.
Note that in our simulations of the real system, the disk is introduced at the beginning of
the time step but may crash only at the end of a time step. Hence the age of death of a disk
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Figure 6: CDF of the number of fragments per disk in the system.
is greater or equal than one in our model. Our formal expression for the distribution of the
disk occupancy is tight
Figure 6 shows the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of the number of pieces per
disk in the system during a simulation of SM. It is compared with the CDF of the geometric
law of parameter f (f = 1/(24 ∗ 365) here) normalized by the average disk occupancy
B ∗ (s + r)/N . We see that the distribution of disk occupancy is pretty close from what
expected from the previous discussion.
6.2 Refinement of the Fluid Model
This strong heterogeneity of the number of fragments per disk may have a deep impact on
the variations of the system. As a matter of fact, when the system experiences a disk failure,
we may loose a lot of fragments if the disk was almost full, but a lot less for a young disk.
Hence we propose a refinement of the Fluid Model. For each disk failure, we randomly
choose the number of fragments present on the disk. More precisely, we add to the model a
random variable Ω(t, ω), which represents the filling ratio of the disk that crashed. When a
disk crashes, we choose Ω(t, ω) according to the following distribution:
Pr[Ω(t, ω) = k
f
] = (1 − f)k−1f for 1 ≤ k < kmax
Pr[Ω(t, ω) = kmax
f
] = 1 − (1 − f)kmax ,
the principle being:
❼ to choose the disk age according to the geometric;
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❼ to normalize it to obtain a average filling ratio of 1 (E[Ω(t, ω)] = 1). It is enough to
multiply the values of Ω by f as E[death age] = 1/f ;
❼ to truncate the distribution, as a disk does not receive any fragments when it is full.
fkmax is equal to the disk maximum size.
Hence, the percentage of blocks concerned by a disk fault is no more µi, but µi ·Ω(t, ω).
In the matrician formalism, the matrix F , that represents the impact of a fault on the state
vector X becomes a random matrix F (t, ω), defined as
F (t, ω) =









1 − µ · Ω(t, ω) µ · Ω(t, ω)
µ · Ω(t, ω)
. . .
. . .
. . .
. . .
. . .
µ · Ω(t, ω) 1 − µ · Ω(t, ω)









6.3 Analysis of the Refined Fluid Model
The same kind of analysis can be done than in Section 5, albeit the difficulties introduced
by the fact that we have now a stochastic failure matrix F (t, ω). The structure of the proof
is the same, but the computation of the moments of the transition matrix, M(t, ω), differs.
Expectation.
For the computation of the average behavior of the system, only the expectation of the
transition matrix changes.
E[M(t, ω)] = E[lF (t, ω) + (1 − l)R] = lE[F (t, ω)] + (1 − l)R.
E[F (t, ω)] = E[F ′(t, ω)R] = E[F ′(t, ω)]R,
as F ′ is independent of R. Hence, we have E[F (t, ω)] = E[F ]. Therefore, we obtain the same
expectation than in the previous Fluid Model.
Standard Deviation.
For the computation of the standard deviation, one have to recompute the matrix N , of
the cross-products of elements of M(t, ω). More precisely, recall that we have
Ni′j′ = E[mi,k1mj, k2],
with i′ = ind(i, j) and j′ = ind(k1, k2). As the matrix F is now stochastic, we have to sum
over all possible disk fillings Ω(t, ω). We note F (k) the matrix F for a filling ratio equal to
k. It gives
Ni′j′ =
kmax
∑
k=1
Pr[Ω(t, ω) = fk](lF
(k)
ik1
F
(k)
jk2
) + (1 − l)Rik1Rjk2 .
INRIA
Analysis of Failure Correlation in Peer-to-Peer Storage Systems 29
6.4 Validation of the model
We compare here the behavior of the Refined Fluid Model (RFM) given by theory and the
one of the Simulation Model (SM). Figure 7 shows the standard deviation of the bandwidth
use in both cases (results for the FM are also given to show the improvements provided by
the RFM). We see that the values are very close and differ by only few percents. Note that
the average bandwidth use is the about the same in all these experiments and is close to
1.37Mbits/s. We ran extensive sets of simulations to validate the model for different values
of the parameters. A summary is given in Table 4. We see that when making the threshold
value r0 vary between 1 and 9 (r is 10 in this experiment) or the average disk lifetime LD,
the standard errors differ from 2 to 4 percents. We can conclude the system is modeled very
closely by the RFM.
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Figure 7: Bandwidth std. deviation vs number of peers for SM, RFM (FM also given for
comparison).
6.5 Model Discussions - Future Directions
We showed that the Refined Fluid Modelclosely models the behavior of the real system. In
fact, we see that the non uniform repartition of the fragments between the different disks
increases the standard deviation of the bandwidth use. To lower the impact of disk age and
have more uniform disk fillings, we propose two new policies:
❼ Shuffling algorithms. At each time step, a proportion of the fragments in the system
are chosen at random and sent each to a random disk. If all fragments are concerned,
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r0 1 2 3 4 5 7 8 9
SM 1.07 1.05 1.02 1.02 1.00 0.98 0.97 0.93
RFM 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.95
MTBF 1 2 3 4 5 6 8 10
SM 0.40 0.58 0.69 0.80 0.90 0.97 1.11 1.54
RFM 0.38 0.55 0.67 0.78 0.87 0.96 1.09 1.66
Table 4: Standard error for SM and RFM (MTBF is in years).
we obtain an ideal system with perfectly uniform repartition of the fragments among
the disks. Note that in fact, the first Fluid Model of Section 5 models almost exactly
this ideal system. The advantages of such policy are that it lowers the differences in
number of fragments of the disks, but also decreases the correlation between old blocks
that were more present on old disks. However, a drawback is the introduction of more
network traffic in the system to transfer the fragments.
❼ Biased reconstruction policy. An other way to have more uniform disk fillings
is to change the reconstruction policy. During the last phase of the reconstruction,
the rebuilt fragments are sent to random peers. We propose to choose these peers
not uniformly, but to select with higher probability disks with less data. Do so, the
new disks will be filled faster. One drawback of this policy, is that it reinforces the
correlation between blocks rebuilt at the same time. But it has the advantage of not
changing the bandwidth needs.
We are currently studying the impact of this new policies on the storage system: failure
correlation, bandwidth. . .
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we studied the behavior of a peer-to-peer system storing data blocks. We
showed using simulations and formal analysis that modeling such a system by independent
blocks, each following its own Markov Chain was very far from reality: If expectations are
perfectly captured, deviations from the mean are extremely underestimated. This is due to
correlation: in this system a disk crash affects tens of thousand of blocks. We also proved
by simulation that these variations (e.g.in bandwidth usage) can have a severe impact on
the reliability (probability to loose data).
We then introduced two tractable fluid models capturing most of the system dynamic.
Simulations show that these models give very tight results. We believe that the methods
proposed in this paper can be applied in other contexts where correlation phenomena occur.
This also raises a more theoretical question. The fluid models have a simple dynamic, since
it is defined as a random product of two small dimension matrices. Determining the behavior
of such a product is known to be untractable, but in our specific case we succeeded to get
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exact formulas and compute the moments of the distribution. It would be interesting to find
general non trivial conditions (other than commutability) under which the dynamic can be
computed.
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